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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF EX PARTE
CONTACTS IN INFORMAL
RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS-
HOME BOX OFFICE V. FCC
A Federal Communications Commission 1 administrator telephones
an expert affiliated with an industry likely to be affected by a forth-
coming agency regulation. The expert answers questions concerning
data contained in the record which the administrator is reviewing
prior to issuing the regulation. This ex parte 2 conversation is quickly
forgotten when the Commission promulgates its rule. Subsequently, a
party disliking the new rule learns of the phone call and brings it to
the attention of the reviewing court. Is the newly promulgated rule
valid? The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held in Home Box Office v. FCC 3 that the innocuous phone call
would vitiate the agency's rule. In other words, any court confronted
with this situation must strike the rule and remand the case to the
agency.4  This case focused consideration once again on one of the
most difficult questions in administrative law: 5 whether an agency
should permit ex parte communications in an informal rulemaking
proceeding. 6
1. Hereinafter referred to as the FCC.
2. In this Note, the term "ex parte contacts" refers to oral or written statements by any
party to a proceeding to anyone in a decision making position, without notice to the other
parties. See Lovett, Ex Parte and the FCC: The New Regulations, 21 F. COMM. B.J. 54 (1967).
3. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Home
Box Office].
4. The court may also require an outside examiner to hear testimony and collect data
regarding the propriety of the conversations and memoranda communicated secretly. The court-
appointed examiner could, in those situations, order the disqualification of a party or a commis-
sioner if the colmmunications were improper.
5. Ex parte contacts have been a problem for some time. In 1961, President Kennedy
noted:
This problem is one of the most complex in the entire field of government regula-
tion. It involves the elimination of ex parte contacts when those contacts are unjust
to other parties [or the public], while preserving the capacity of an agency to avail
itself of information necessary to decision. Much of the difficulty stems from the
broad range of agency activities-ranging from judicial type adjudication to wide-
ranging regulation of entire industries.
Message of the President on Ethical Conduct in Government, H.R. Doc. No. 145, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7 (1961).
6. See generally GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS
1020-22 (6th ed. 1974). Today there exists a plethora of testimony alleging that because of the
influence of Washington lobbyists, administrative agencies (1) ignore or gloss over the public
interest, (2) merely mediate between the powerful interest groups while neglecting the weaker
one, or (3) become "captured" by those very interests which they were supposed to regulate.
Public suspicion of the agencies, already formidable, is compounded by the discovery of ex
parte communication. Persons not privy to the ex parte sessions feel that they cannot know the
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In 1972 the FCC initiated informal rulemaking 7 proceedings on the
regulation 8 of Cablecast 9 and Subscription 1o broadcast television sta-
tions. In compliance with section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 1' public notice12 of the proposed rulemaking was given and
underlying reasons for the agency's decision, that they are being left out of the rulemaking
process, and that they are precluded from testing the sufficiency of evidence communicated ex
parte.. See, e.g., M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 67-242 (1975). See also J. MICHAEL &
R. FORT, WORKING ON THE SYSTEM 261 (1974). It was related here, for example, that a broad-
cast license applicant vaguely offered an FCC staff attorney a job while his application was
pending, The authors maintained that this sense of "laxness" was typical. Id. at 262.
The Home Box Office court felt that the FCC glossed over the public interest in favor of
mediating between the powerful broadcast industry and the less powerful cable television.
Home Box Office at 53.
7. Rulemaking is the agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule. Sec-
tion 551(4) of the Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter referred to as the APA) defines
"rule" as:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or de-
scribing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
Rulemaking is basically "formal" or "informal." It is informal if the procedural requirements of
§ 553 of the APA (5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970)) are applicable. See notes 22-35 and accompanying text
infra.
8. The FCC began its informal rulemaking proceedings concerning the regulation of Cable-
cast and Subscription television stations because there was a fear of "syphoning." Officials and
interested parties felt that both the Cablecast and Subscription television stations would, be-
cause of superior financing, be able to outbid the regular broadcasting channels for shows which
would normally be shown on free television. Home Box Office at 28.
9. "As used herein pay cable (or just pay TV) is the service whereby nonbroadcast pro-
gramming is distributed over cable television systems whose channels are also used to carry
broadcast programming, and subscribers are charged an additional program or channel fee be-
yond the regular monthly fee for the system's broadcast signal carriage service." Petition for
Certiorari at 3, n.2, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.
10. "Subscription television is the service whereby programs are transmitted in scrambled
form and can be received in intelligible form by the use of decoders for which subscribers are
charged a fee." Id. at 4, n.3. The FCC's rules on the regulation of subscription television were
affirmed by the Home Box Office court and will not be discussed in this Note. Home Box Office
at 59-60.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). Section 553 reads in pertinent part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall in-
elude-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceed-
ings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance 9 f the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the ruling [sic) making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
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comments were requested to be made within two weeks. At various
times before, during, and after this defined period, almost all of the
interested parties made ex parte contacts with various members and
staff of the FCC.13 Several of these contacts occurred during crucial
periods of the decisionmaking process and ostensibly influenced the
final result. 14  The FCC issued four rules regulating and limiting the
programming of Cablecast and Subscription television stations. 15 The
rules made no mention of the ex parte contacts or any information
obtained privately.
Home Box Office Co. and others adversely affected successfully
challenged the FCC action.16 The court found that the rules violated
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules
are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the is-
suance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
12. The Notice read:
All interested persons are invited to file written comments on the rule making
proposals on or before September 15, 1972 and reply comment on or before Sep-
tember 29, 1972. . . . In reaching a decision in this matter, the Commission may
take into account any other relevant information before it, in addition to the com-
ments invited by this Notice.
35 F.C.C. 2d 899 (1972).
13. ABC television contacted members of Congress to pressure the FCC. The trade press
reported that when word of the proposed rule leaked out, lobbyists of both Cable and Broadcast
television rushed to the Commission to oppose different facets. After the close of oral argument,
Broadcast interests met 18 times with Commission personnel, Cable interests met 9 times, and
public interest intervenors not at all. Home Box Office at 53.
14. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Henry Geller, Home Box Office v. FCC 75-1280 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 27, 1977).
15. The rules promulgated by the FCC were:
(1) The pay exhibition of feature films more than 3 but less than 10 years old shall
be prohibited;
(2) The pay exhibition of specific sports events (e.g., the World Series) which have
been shown on broadcast television within the previous 5 years shall be prohibited;
(3) The pay exhibition of more than the minimum number of non-specific sports
events (i.e., regular season events) which had not been broadcast in any of the 5
preceding years shall be prohibited; and
(4) The pay exhibition of all series programs (i.e., programs with interconnected
plots) shall be prohibited.
47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975), as amended by Second Report and Order - F.C.C. 2d - 35 P&F
RADIO REG. 2d 707 (1975).
16. The following parties were involved in related suits: (1) Home Box Office, (2) Metro
Media, Inc., (3) Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., (4) United Artists Corp. and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., (5) Motion Picture Association of America, (6) National Association of
Broadcasters, (7) American Broadcasting Company, Inc., (8) CBS, Inc., (9) National Broadcast-
ing Co.
Professional Baseball, American Broadcasting Co., CBS, Inc., and the National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting intervened in several of the suits.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:489
the First Amendment,' 7 exceeded the scope of FCC authority, 1 8 and
were arbitrary and capricious. 19 However, an additional basis of de-
cision, if not limited, could have greater precedential significance and
greater impact on the operations of the FCC and other administrative
agencies. Ex parte communications, according to the D.C. Circuit
Court, violated fundamental notions of fairness and frustrated judicial
review. 20  Accordingly, such contacts should be prohibited once
notice of the proposed rulemaking is issued, and should be recorded
and publicly reported if they do occur. 21 A concurring opinion sup-
ported the ban on ex parte contacts in this and other limited cir-
cumstances.
This Note will examine the court's decision on the subject of ex
parte communications and will discuss its potential impact on the in-
formal rulemaking process. It will include an explanation of informal
rulemaking and the relative importance and dangers of ex parte con-
tacts and an analysis of the court's opinion from the perspective of
prior case law. Finally, this Note will point out inadequacies in the
approaches offered by the Home Box Office decision and will suggest
an alternative method of dealing with the ex parte contacts question.
IMPORTANCE OF Ex PARTE CONTACTS
Prior to Home Box Office, agency treatment of ex parte contacts
depended on whether the agency action was a rulemaking or an ad-
judication. 22  Ex parte contacts are prohibited in a formal agency
17. The court held that the Commission's orders contravened the First Amendment because
the anti-siphoning provisions regulated the content of what pay TV systems could present with-
out a clear-cut showing that the regulations were necessary to protect the free speech rights of
others. Home Box Office at 46-48. The court said that pay TV regulations must proceed under
a different standard because the speech limitations present in the free TV electromagnetic sys-
tern are not present in pay cable systems. Id. at 43-46.
18. The court held that the Commission's authority extended only to those matters reasona-
bly ancillary to long-established (either judicially or legislatively recognized) goals of communi-
cations industry regulation. Home Box Office, at 28-30. See United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972).
19. The court held that there was no evidence in the record justifying a need for regulation
and therefore the rule should be vacated because even a perfectly reasonable regulation may be
capricious if the problem to which it is appropriate does not exist. Home Box Office, at 34-40.
See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074
(1972).
20. Home Box Office at 57.
21. Id.
22. The validity of trying to make absolute distinctions between adjudication and rulemaking
has been called into question. See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 738-39 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972). Nevertheless, the distinction is useful analytically.
See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224, 244 (1973), which is the best
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adjudication. 23 Generally, ir) an agency adjudication trial-type pro-
cedures are used in a controversy over particular factual events. 24 In
determining the truth of factual matters, the ban on ex parte contacts
is one of the system's procedural safeguards designed to screen out
undependable information. 25 Additionally, the prohibition on ex
parte contacts serves to protect the system's perceived neutrality by
avoiding the appearance of favoritism or bias which could be fostered
by private communications between a decisionmaker and an in-
terested party.26
On the other hand, ex parte contacts traditionally have been al-
lowed in informal rulemaking because of the quasi-legislative nature
authority for the distinction. See also Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of Gen-
eral Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60
CALF. L. REV. 1276, 1277-78 (1972).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). Adjudication is the process by which the agency formulates an
order. Id. § 551(7). An order is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule
making but including licensing." Id. § 551(6). Such procedures include the taking of evidence,
issuing subpoenaes, taking depositions, using transcripts which constitute the exclusive record,
presenting cases or defenses by oral or documentary evidence, submitting rebuttal evidence and
conducting cross-examination. Id. § 556. 'Ihe record is required to include findings and conclu-
sions, the reasons for them, and all material issues of fact, law, and discretion. Id. § 557.
Private communications were expressly prohibited by § 557(d), an amendment contained in the
Government in the Sunshine Act. Private communications in this setting are as out of place as
are out-of-court statements made to the judge or jury by one of the parties to litigation. Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 20 (1938).
It should be noted that adjudicatory procedures are also applicable to what is called "formal"
rulemaking. This does not alter the essential dichotomy between § 553 and §§ 556-557 proce-
dures, which are distinguished in the text as informal rulemaking versus adjudication.
24. See Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 14 (1947, reprint
1973). Professor Davis believes that the crucial component in determining when trial-type pro-
cedures are appropriate is whether the facts are in dispute. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.01, at 411 (1958). If the facts concern "the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties" and involve "questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what
motive or intent," then trial-type procedures are mandated. Id. at 413.
25. Koch, Discovery in Rulemaking, 1977 DUKE L.J. 295, 296 (1977): "The testimonial de-
vices of the trial process . . . are purifiers." Cf. Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Evidence
(1976) (unpublished manuscript on file, DePaul University College of Law Library). The major-
ity report recoiled from advocating the use of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses as
substantive proof in civil or criminal trials in part because of the "inherent unreliability" of the
"ex parte, litigation motivated, interview statement." Id. at 9. The majority stated that "[w]e
think it extremely desirable in the search for truth that today's ex parte statement must be
transformed into tomorrow's open court testimony given under oath or affirmation and subject
then to cross-examination before it is of substantive validity." Id. at 16. It is unnecessary to here
consider the wisdom of the Committee's recommendations. It is useful, nevertheless, to point
out that this evidences a typical concern over the reliability of material submitted ex parte. On
the importance of accuracy in evaluating procedural systems, see Boyer, Alternatives to Ad-
ministrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues,
71 MIcH. L. REV. 111, 137-45 (1972).
26. Boyer, supra note 25, at 146-50; see also Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte
Communications with Administrative Agencies, 76 HARY. L. REV. 233, 255 (1962).
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of the proceeding.2 7 The issues at stake usually concern broad ques-
tions of policy to which particularized, objective facts are not deter-
minative in making a decision. 28  While an adjudicatory action is de-
signed to accurately apply legal sanctions to the prior conduct of the
parties, an informal rulemaking action is designed as an investigatory
process preceding the execution of a rule normally conceived for fu-
ture effect.2 9 The operation of a rule disadvantages persons only on
the basis of their future relationship to a chosen government policy
and not for objective reasons. 30
Informal rulemaking has several advantages over formal adjudica-
tion. 31  First, greater clarity often is gained through focusing on is-
sues of general applicability.3 2 Second, rulemaking is fairer because
it is prospective. Therefore, parties will be cognizant of the rules be-
fore their plans are developed. 33 Third, rulemaking is regarded as
27. See Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Infor-
mal Rulemaking Proceedings, 15 Administrative Conference of the United States (Aug. 4, 1977).
Section 555(b) of the APA appears to authorize ex parte contacts:
So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested person may
appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjust-
ment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding,
whether interlocutory, summary, or otherwise, or in connection with an agency
function ...
5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
28. Boyer, supra note 25, at 148. Boyer quotes from Reich, The Law of the Planned Soci-
ety, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1237-38 (1966), to the effect that judicialized procedures perpetuate the
myth that the government rewards some and punishes others for objective reasons, whereas in
reality the government allocates privilege and penalties in accordance with policy preferences
that are not grounded on objective merits. Id. at n.137. Boyer also cites R. NOLL, REFORMING
REGULATION 33 (1971), in which the author claims that general public distrust of the political
system and a naive faith in non-political expert judgments combined to produce the indepen-
dent regulatory agency.
In United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), Justice Frankfurter emphasized the judg-
ment factor inherent in the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to set the rates which market
agencies could charge for their services at the Kansas City stockyards when he stated:
Doubts and difficulties incapable of exact resolution confront judgment .... [S]ince
the Secretary is the guardian of the public interest . . . [hie must consider whether
these [rates] represent services which properly should be charged to the public.
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
29. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.02 (1958); Eisenberg, Private Or-
dering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637, 665
(1976); Koch, supra note 25, at 296. See also Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act, supra note 24, at 12-16.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 922-42 (1965). See also Wright, The Courts and the
Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375-78 (1974).
32. Id. It is more difficult to discover agency policy from reading previously decided cases
than from reading a rule. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 940-41.
33. In an adjudication, on the other hand, the parties are subject to ad hoc determinations
of the law which are clearly expressed for the first time at enforcement. Wright, supra note 31,
at 376.
HOME BOX OFFICE V. FCC
more democratic than adjudication because all interested parties may
participate in the proceeding. Often the agency will solicit advice and
information from those only remotely affected or those not otherwise
able to contribute to an adjudication. 34 Finally, the informal
rulemaking procedure more effectively utilizes expert testimony. 35
These advantages 36 mainly flow from the fact that the agency is not
merely a tribunal umpiring a dispute. Rather, it conducts each phase
of the process itself. The responsibility to set priorities, schedule an
agenda, frame the issues, and accumulate data rests primarily with
the agency and not with the parties. Hence the procedures are more
flexible, the data accumulated more wide-ranging, and the expertise
collected within the agency can be quite formidable. In a trial or in
trial-type proceedings, the parties themselves prepare the case based
on the assumption that they are in a better position than the de-
cisionmaker to know the operative facts. In an informal rulemaking
proceeding, in contrast, the agency is presumed to be most familiar
with all of the possible ramifications of a rule. However, the pre-
sumption of agency expertise will reflect reality only if facts and ideas
flow freely between the agency and those who have detailed knowl-
edge of the regulated activities and will be affected by proposed
rules. Consequently, informal ex parte communications are very im-
portant to informal rulemaking actions. 37
Ex parte contacts are also convenient because they are less burden-
some to all the parties involved in informal rulemaking. Legislative
proposals for the recordation or logging of ex parte contacts have
been criticized as excessively burdensome to administrative agen-
cies. 38  The costs to the agency would increase because of the ex-
34. Wright, supra note 31, at 379. See also 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 24, at § 6.02.
35. Wright, supra note 31, at 376.
36. Other advantages offered by informal rulemaking include: (1) more flexibility in choosing
procedures better suited for policy formation; (2) more opportunity to develop and articulate
standards; (3) the increased size of the group enabled to seek judicial review; and (4) the less
expensive procedures. See Shapiro, supra note 31, at 936-42.
37. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 24, at § 6.02. Informal conferences may be more useful than a
formal hearing. Professor Davis noted that:
To a slothful administrator a hearing precedent to a regulation may be a God-given
opportunity to avoid work and thought. He need only listen with impassively judi-
cial countenance and then forget all he has heard. It is the conference with its give
and take of ideas and information, with its possibilities of detailed exploration of
minor points and hidden corners which stirs the mind to action.
Id. at 365.
38. Most of the proposed legislation concerning ex parte contacts has not covered informal
rulemaking because of a general recognition that it was unwise to impose such a burden on the
administrative agencies in informal rulemaking actions. See Note, Ex Parte Contacts with the
Federal Communications Commission, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1184 (1959); Peck, supra note
1977]
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pense of the recordation and because the agency would most likely
resort to more expensive investigatory procedures. 39  The litigation
generated over the accuracy of the summaries of the oral conversa-
tions would be an additional burden to all concerned.40  Further-
more, recordation or logging requirements would impose undesirable
delays on the agencies. At a time when regulatory agencies are under
increasing attack for excessive delay, 41 the search for expediting pro-
cedures is more pressing.
Another reason for allowing ex parte contacts is their value in deli-
cate negotiations, which often take place most effectively in private,
face-to-face sessions.4 2 Private sessions allow for the exploration of
tentative and compromise positions which could not be explored
26, at 251; Nathanson, supra note 27, at 17. Recently only one of several bills (S.260) in its
original form forbade ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, but this provision was dropped
in the face of almost unanimously hostile testimony in the hearings. Nathanson, supra note 27,
at 17. The little testimony offered to support a general ban on ex parte contacts was cited by the
court. Home Box Office, at 57 n. 128. However, as the court in Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 74-2006 (July 1, 1977) at 37 n.30, noted, Congress did not heed this testimony. The
court also noted:
That (Congress) . . .did not extend ex parte contact provisions of amended section
557 to section 553-even though such an extension was urged upon it during the
hearings-is a sound indication that Congress still does not favor a per se prohibi-
tion or even a "logging" requirement in all such proceedings.
Id. at 31-32 n.28.
39. Cf. Wright, supra note 31, at 386-88. (The author cautions against the judicial imposi-
tion of trial-type procedures because of their tendency to force the agency to use the most time
consuming procedures to insure that they will meet the requirements of judicial review.)
40. See Peck, supra note 26, at 255.
41. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGU-
LATION-DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (July 1977).
42. See Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New
York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811, 836-38 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Informal Bargaining
Process), which discusses the pros and cons of ex parte negotiations. The very informality of the
negotiations engenders candor and aids in the development of agency expertise, although
cover-ups are not in the public interest and an agency's duty is not to shield the regulated
industry from public scrutiny. Additionally, use of informal negotiations gives the agency lever-
age with which to regulate in that the agency may threaten a stronger regulation than they
intend. However, the use of sham goals may raise the specter of an agency not seeking the best
solution to a problem. See also Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401, 451-54 (1975), who
concludes that whether informal conferences are more effective off-the-record depends on the
particular facts of the case. It is believed that generally the agency is in a better position than
the courts to determine whether an ex parte negotiation is appropriate. Compare Koch, supra
note 25, at 300-10, who advocates agency use of pre-hearing conferences to, inter alia, untangle
complex controversies, facilitate consideration of a settlement, test tentative proposals, develop
particularized procedures, and compel participants to disclose relevant information early enough
for public comment. Koch contends, however, that generally pre-hearing conferences should be
open to the public and on-the-record.
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through the medium of public statements. 43  Private sessions also
permit the parties involved to focus on the major issues, free from
the distracting influence of collateral parties and issues. 44
Ex PARTE CONTACTS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Despite the importance of ex parte contacts to administrative agen-
cies, their use has sometimes facilitated improper behavior. 45 At
other times, the use of private communications by a regulated indus-
try representative has contributed to the already formidable public
43. This is precisely what happened in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 74-2006,
(July 1, 1977). In Action for Children's Television, the FCC was faced with the question, inter
alia, of whether to forbid commercial advertising during the broadcast of children's programs.
The FCC negotiated with the Broadcast television representatives (behind the "closed doors" of
the Chairman), who then adopted certain self-policing measures designed to mitigate the abuses
with which the FCC was concerned. Because of these self-regulatory measures, the FCC fore-
stalled any regulation of children's television programming. The broadcast television industry
had previously refused to adopt such measures. See also Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 668. The
author states that "[n]ormally each actor [in a rulemaking action] is willing to modify his position
and each knows of the other's willingness. Therefore, such negotiation often proceeds by a
series of reciprocal concessions. The timing and size of these concessions may be critical ......
See also Nathanson, supra note 27, at 27 n.21. Professor Nathanson believes that the Home
Box Office court was especially concerned that the private communications represented evi-
dence of a "concealed bargaining process." According to Nathanson, such a process, while not
the most "engaging," is not an "unmitigated evil" to be stamped out on court discretion and has
advantages similar to those outlined in the text. See also Williams, supra note 42, at 451-55.
44. Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 677. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 27 n.21. Ex parte con-
tacts, in making communication between the regulators and the regulated easier, may enhance
the belief that the administrator is accountable. For example, an industry leader may call the
agency in order to apprise it of an impending problem. An agency would do well to heed these
calls, for as Boyer, supra note 25, at 141, noted, "[a]gencies cannot risk offending or alienating
their constituencies too deeply, for members of the constituencies can, at the least, make life
difficult for the agency."
The administrator may also find the informal communications allowed in ex parte form to be
helpful. For example, an administrator might call an industry expert for help in interpreting
statistical information when that expert is the foremost authority on a particular matter and
when no one within the agency has comparable abilities. The information thus exchanged is
essential to the successful working of an agency. Interview with Charles A. Koch, Jr., Professor
of Law, DePaul University College of Law and former member of the FTC, in Chicago
(November 1, 1977). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 29, at § 6.02.
45. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (ex parte meetings followed by only a pro
forma hearing resulted in improper and invalid airline fare rates); lassachusetts Bay Telecasters
(MBT), Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (in an FCC adjudication, a private confer-
ence between an interested party with a decision maker justified a court ordered hearing into
the propriety of the action); WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (companion
case to MBT with the same result); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.
1064 D. Col. (1976) (private threats uttered by the FCC chairman behind closed doors and not pursuant
to the APA procedures forced the TV industry to institute a family viewing hour and were
improper). See generally Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970), for a short general history of the famous WHDH improper influence case.
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suspicion of the agencies. 46  Many consider information derived from
secret meetings to be suspect. 47  In addition, the public may suspect
that agency personnel are unable, without the balance provided by
opposing views, to withstand the persuasive advocacy offered by an
industry representative. 48
Originally, section 553 of the APA provided only minimal proce-
dures to insure fairness in the informal rulemaking process. That sec-
tion required that notice be given of a proposed rulemaking pro-
ceeding and that a comment period be set aside for input from all
interested parties. 49 Eventually, however, these procedures alone
proved to be inadequate, and with the "due process explosion," 50
courts added some trial-type safeguards. Consequently, more exten-
sive "hybrid" procedures, tailored to fit each particular agency action,
are now used in addition to the relatively sparse provisions of section
553.51
As a result of this development, when an agency issues its Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, it must detail the facts and the reasoning
prompting the agency action. 52 This explanation increases participa-
tion since the interested parties seeking to comment on the rule will
know which material requires rebuttal or a different interpretational
slant. When the agency adopts its rule, it must publish both the rule
and an extensive explanation which must include the factual basis for
46. See note 6 supra. See also Informal Bargaining Process, supra note 42, at 836, where it
is noted that private negotiations may give rise to a belief that the agency is just a private club
working for the regulated industry to the detriment of the public interest.
47. See note 25 supra.
48. PERTSCHUK, The Lawyer-Lobbyist, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 197 (R. Nader & M.
Green eds. 1976).
49. See note 11 supra.
50. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975); Wright,
supra note 31, at 378.
51. Hybrid rulemaking refers to the use of more procedures than the notice and comment
minimum of § 553 but fewer than the full panoply of trial-type §§ 556-557 procedures. See
Williams, supra note 42. See City of Chicago v. EPA, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972) ("The ability to choose with relative freedom the procedure it will
use to acquire relevant information gives the Commission power to realistically tailor the pro-
ceedings to fit the issues before it. ... (emphasis added)). The Administrative Conference
recommended additional procedures in certain circumstances. For example, if the first notice
contained only a general description of the subject matter, or if comments filed seriously con-
flicted with other data, a second cycle of notice and comment may be desirable. The agency
might also, at various stages of the process, make its tentative views known. Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation 76-3, Procedures in Addition to Notice and
the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1977).
52. This fact was emphasized in the Horne Box Office opinion when the court noted that "an
agency proposing informal rulemaking has an obligation to make its views known to the public
in a concrete and focused form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible."
Homne Box Office at 36.
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the rule, the inferences drawn, and the policy judgments made. 53
Finally, preenforcement judicial review provides aggrieved parties an
opportunity to question or contradict the sufficiency of the agency's
factual support and the rationality of the inferences drawn from those
facts, or to assert that the policy judgments were capricious. 54
The imposition of these procedures reflects a concern for the fair-
ness of the administrative process. The procedures provide an oppor-
tunity for meaningful participation, an adequate revelation of the
agency's reasoning, and the agency's justification for its action. 55
These procedures, however, have not expressly ruled out ex parte
contacts in informal rulemaking. 56
The Home Box Office decision is the first one to expose the dan-
gers which ex parte contacts pose in due process terms. 57  The main
53. Compare Survey, Model Review of Informal Rulemaking: Recommendation 74-4 of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 1975 DUKE L.J. 479, 491 (1975) with Auerbach,
Informal Rule-making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures & Judicial
Review, 72 Nw. L. REV. 15, 23 (1977).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also
Nathanson, supra note 27, at 22.
55. These components of due process were characterized as the formal aim of justification
and the associational aims of revelation and participation in Michelman, Formal and Associa-
tional Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126-71 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1977). According to Michelnan, the associational aims of due process attach value to the person
being told why he is being treated in a particular fashion and to his participating in the making
of the decision. This is important because he may wish to make political use of the information
or to counter the effect of the decision in other ways, or to make personal use of the information
if, for example, "it fills a potentially destructive gap in the individual's conception of himself."
An opportunity to communicate with the decision maker is important because one may dissuade
the decision maker from taking an action, or because of the intrinsic value of making an apt
contribution to decisions affecting oneself.
The formal aim of justification inherent in due process is more readily understood for it
concerns the necessity for the decision maker to have adequate reasons for taking an action. The
accuracy of the factual premise for the decision is important to its justifiability. Whereas the
agency's procedures for promulgating a rule primarily determine whether the associational aims
are met, the courts during judicial review have an integral role in determining whether the
agency has adequately justified its decision.
See Boyer, supra note 25, at 137-50, which sets forth 3 criteria to evaluate the merit of
procedural systems: accuracy, efficiency and acceptability. The accuracy and acceptability com-
ponents would seem to parallel Michelman's formal and associational aims. The efficiency com-
ponent seems to be not included in Michelman's paradigm. However, it is axiomatic that any
procedures which protect one interest "without regard to the overall efficacy of the rulemaking
process will necessarily act to the detriment of other interest groups or perspectives, including
the general 'public interest'." Koch, supra note 25, at 300.
56. The Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-709, 90 Stat. 1241 (Sept. 13,
1976), amended the APA to include a prohibition on ex parte contacts only in formal agency
rulemaking or adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1970).
57. Other courts have spoken of ex parte contacts in more general terms. See, e.g., WKAT,
Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nom. Public Service Televi-
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emphasis of the court was that private communications undermine
the entire informal rulemaking process. The court felt that if the offi-
cial administrative record did not reflect the true motivating influ-
ences on the administrator, then the procedure for notice and
comment was a "sham." 58  Additionally, the court recognized the
necessity for public input which it termed as reliable as the agency's
own internal studies. 59 However, it is impossible for the public to
comment on, rebut, or add to data or reasoning that remains undis-
closed. 60 Insofar as the lack of communication and effective public
participation prevented the agency from making an informed,
reasoned decision, the court felt that the final rule was unjustifiable.6 1
PRIOR CASE LAW
The courts' task in judicial review of an agency's action is to bal-
ance the due process rights of the parties involved with the need of
the agency for efficacious rulemaking. However, prior court decisions
varied in regards to permitting ex parte contacts. Factors considered
by courts were the similarities of an agency action to an adjudica-
tion;62 the similarity of the privately communicated facts to those
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 368 U.S. 841 (1961) (ex parte influence "'eat[s] at the very heart of our system
of government-due process, fair play, open proceedings, unbiased, uninfluenced decisions.");
Massachusetts Bay Telecasters v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1958)("[i]mproper influence,
if established, going to the very core of the Commission's quasi-judicial powers is certainly
critical.").
Commentators also have been more general. For example, President Kennedy was concerned
with ex parte contacts because "some of the most spectacular examples of official misconduct
have involved ex parte communication. ... See Message of the President on Ethical Conduct
in the Government, H.R. Doc. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1961). See generally Peck,
supra note 26, in which the author notes that "an ex parte communication by one of several
parties gives the appearance of an unequal and unjust administration of law and undermines the
public confidence in governmental process." Id. at 255.
58. Home Box Office at 54.
59. Id. at 54-55. See also Infornal Bargaining Process, supra note 42, at 832-33, which
points out that little weight will be given to public comments if an industry-agency bargain has
been struck.
60. Home Box Office at 54-55. See also Informal Bargaining Process, supra note 42, at 833,
which notes that ex parte sessions may facilitate an industry-agency myopia. Hence, any diver-
gent views offered by the public will be ignored.
61. Home Box Office at 58-59. See also Informal Bargaining Process, supra note 42, at 833,
which contends that the use of ex parte sessions inhibits agency articulation of policy.
62. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 855-56 m.36 (1970)
(court approvingly quoted the FCC to the effect that the ex parte contact at issue was an attack
on the integrity of the Commission's adjudicatory processes); Sangamon Valley Television Corp.
v. FCC, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964), see notes 67 & 68
and accompanying text infra; Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 67
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ("Improper influence, if established, going to the very core of the Commis-
sion's quasi-judicial powers is certainly critical."); Jarrott v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp. 827, 833
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susceptible of being found through an adjudication; 63 and certain in-
choate feelings that the proceeding was unfair.
64
The seminal case in the area of ex parte contacts is Sangamon Val-
ley Television Corp. v. FCC.65 Sangamon involved an informal
rulemaking action shifting a VHF channel from one city to another.
The president of the company interested in obtaining the channel
admitted making ex parte presentations to each commissioner. 66 Be-
cause these ex parte contacts had remained undisclosed, the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia vitiated the agency action and re-
manded the case for an evidentiary hearing as to the contacts.
The Sangamon court's holding rested upon three factors. The first
was the similarity between an agency adjudication and agency action
where "conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege" are in-
volved.6 7 Sangamon, for example, involved only a few parties com-
peting with each other for the exclusive right to broadcast on a par-
ticular channel. 68 Given the adversity of the parties, and the clear
standards applicable to the proceeding the court felt that more strin-
gent procedural safeguards were in order.
Secondly, the Sangamon court was influenced by the fact that the
FCC had violated its own rules, which prohibited ex parte contacts
after the close of the comment period. The court held that an agency
action violative of its own rules could not stand. 69
(D.D.C. 1964) (the zoning board "performs judicial functions within its narrow and specialized
jurisdiction," making ex parte contacts improper).
63. See, e.g., Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 236 F.2d 727, 730 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1956) (ex parte presentations were in regard to a nationwide
problem preceding the execution of a general rule of policy and hence not improper).
64. These cases are important because the court decided adversely to the agency only if
there appeared to be substantive impropriety. District of Columbia Federation of Civic Ass'ns
v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reversal required because pressure exerted by
Representative Natcher and others did have an impact on Secretary Volpe's decision). See, e.g.,
Courtaulds (Ala.), Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899, 904-05 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (despite ex parte con-
tacts, "[w]e find no evidence that the Commission improperly did anything"); Ruppert v.
Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1973) (judge permitted limited discovery into the ex
parte contacts question and then determined that there was no impropriety).
65. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
66. 1d. at 223-24.
67. Id. at 224.
68. Id.
69. Id. The FCC has a rule that when it proposed an allocation of TV channels there would
be a cut-off date for all comments on that allocation. 47 C.F.R. § 1.213 (1958). By permitting ex
parte contacts beyond that cut-off date, the FCC had violated that rule. Id. at 225.
This argument was also erroneously raised by the majority in Home Box Office. Home Box
Office, at 55-56 n.122. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in Home Box Office, supra
note 12, set no cut-off date for comments. And since Sangamon, it has been the policy of the
FCC to permit comments whenever not specifically limited to some time period by the Notice
of Rulemaking. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 2 n.2.
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Finally, the ex parte communications included information involv-
ing the offending party's broadcasting capabilities, a factual issue
traditionally determinable by adjudication. The court considered this
private communication "critical" in reaching its decision since the op-
posing party could not rebut or test this fact, even though "[it con-
travened] the[ir] principal contention," because they did not and
could not know that it had been made. 70
ANALYSIS OF HOME Box OFFICE
The Sangamon holding was limited to those instances where "con-
flicting claims to a valuable privilege" comprised the rulemaking ac-
tion. Nevertheless, the Home Box Office court, which banned all ex
parte contacts, contended that it was following the Sangamon ap-
proach as expanded by recent congressional and presidential actions.
The court felt that the recently enacted Sunshine Act 7 ' represented
congressional policy to prohibit agency secrecy. However, the court
noted that "the Sunshine Act by its terms does not apply here." 72
The Sunshine Act only banned ex parte contacts from formal ad-
judicatory proceedings. 73 Thus, the court's reliance upon this Act to
"clarify" the Sangamon decision was misplaced.
Additionally, the court relied upon a Presidential Order forbidding
ex parte contacts between White House staff members and partici-
pants before the Civil Aeronautics Board. CAB proceedings are simi-
lar to adjudicatory proceedings 74 with the President having the right
to review those decisions on either national defense or national secu-
rity grounds. 75 The executive order allowed ex parte contacts when
needed for reasons of defense or foreign policy, but forbade airline
representatives from using ex parte sessions to bypass the CAB on
matters which, by statute, were within the jurisdiction of the CAB,
by arguing their cases in the White House. 76 The Home Box Office
case did not present a situation where those making ex parte contacts
were secretly bypassing the decisionmaker. Rather, those making the
contacts were communicating with the decisionmaker. Thus, the un-
70. 269 F.2d at 224.
71. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (Sept. 13, 1976).
72. Home Box Office at 56 n.125.
73. See note 56 supra.
74. As Professor Nathanson points out, Presidential review of international air rate certifica-
tions takes place only after formal, on-the-record, adversary proceedings where the airlines have
competed for those certifications before the CAB. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 32 n.28.
75. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 9, at 41 n.50; Nathanson, supra note 27, at 32
n.28.
76. Id.
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derlying rationale of the executive order is inapplicable to Home Box
Office. Consequently, neither the Presidential Order nor the Sun-
shine Act is applicable to the informal rulemaking action of the FCC
in Home Box Office.
The Home Box Office court also claimed to find support in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe. 77 In Overton the Court held that judicial review of adminis-
trative action was only effective if the court could examine all the
information known to the administrator at the time the decision was
made and that without a full administrative record, the Court could
not presume that the administrator had acted fairly. 78 Because the
77. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton, Secretary of Transportation Volpe had approved a
highway route through a Memphis Public Park. A statute, Dept. of Transportation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1653(b) (1970), allowed the approval of such routes only when no feasible alternative
route existed. Secretary Volpe issued neither findings nor any statement that a feasible alterna-
tive route did not exist. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to take
testimony from certain administrators in order to determine whether the Secretary had com-
plied with the statute.
The Home Box Office court cited Overton for the proposition that judicial review mandates
additional procedural safeguards. Home Box Office at 54-55. Other court decisions have also
required additional procedures in order to facilitate judicial review. See, e.g., National Nutri-
tional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827
(1975) ("agency action will not be upheld where inadequacy of explanation frustrates review");
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the
agency should have, upon remand, responded to an analysis repudiating EPA test data in order
for the court to be able to exercise effective judicial review); Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1088,
1030-31 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("so long as we have the duty to review these orders of the CAB
fixing international fares, then this appellate tribunal should be provided with an appropriate
record on which review can be had"); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1254 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("an examination of the purposes and provisions of the substantive statute being adminis-
tered may require [the imposition of more procedures] than the comparatively feeble [notice and
comment] provisions of § 553."). In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973), the court remanded to have the record supplemented in order for the court -o
determine if congressional objectives were achieved. The court contemplated that "in the inter-
est of providing a reasoned decision, the remand proceeding will involve some opportunity for
cross-examination." Contra, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 852 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Chevron Oil Co. v. FPC, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973) Congress intended to allow
administrative agencies a broad latitude in adopting rulemaking procedures, (formal procedures
are not required); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (court cautioned administrators that the statutory requirement of a concise and general
statement of support for a rule must be accomodated to the realities of judicial scrutiny).
78. 401 U.S. at 420. The Court stated that the Secretary's decision was entitled to a pre-
sumption of regularity, but that such a presumption could not shield his action "from a
thorough, probing, in-depth review." Id. at 415. It should be noted that in the guise of an
in-depth review, the Court found it necessary to take testimony from the administrators in
order to determine whether they had complied with the statute, an action inconsistent with a
presumption of regularity. Professor Davis has called the Overton Court's rejection of the pre-
sumptions of regularity "one of the most astonishing aspects of this astonishing decision." K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 11.00 at 317 (1976). For Davis' complete
critical discussion ofOverton, see id. at §§ 11.00, 16.00-1, 28.08, 28.16, 29.00, 29.01-1, 29.01-2,
29.01-3, 29.01-5, 29.01-7.
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information exchanged ex parte in Home Box Office was not sum-
marized on the record, the court found that it was unable to review
the agency's action effectively. 79 Moreover, the court found that
without a complete administrative record, it could not presume that
the FCC had promulgated a fair rule.8 0 Despite these superficial
similarities, there are several reasons why the Home Box Office court
should not have relied upon the Overton rationale.
Overton is distinguishable from Home Box Office in an important
respect. In Overton a particularized finding was statutorily mandated
and no statement of administrative findings was made. 8' The Over-
ton opinion, read in context, held that the reviewing court must
examine all of the information known to the administrator only when
a statute specifically requires a certain finding and when the agency
or administrator neglects to make it. Since no statute applicable to
the FCC required specific findings in the Home Box Office case, and
because the FCC in Home Box Office provided a statement of find-
ings anyway, the court's reliance on Overton was inapposite.8 2
In addition, application of the Overton requirement of complete
disclosure of information sources in all informal rulemaking actions
would be impractical. An expansive reading of Overton to require
recordation of "every informational input" into the deliberative pro-
cess of the administrator could logically lead to a judicial inquiry en-
compassing, for example, newspaper and television stories and edito-
rials, and might logically culminate with a requirement that the
79. Home Box Office at 54.
80. Id. at 54-55. The court cited Professor Davis' view of Overton without mentioning that
it was uniformly hostile.
81. The FCC in Home Box Office was required by § 553 of the APA to issue a statement of
the basis and reasoning for the rule, but it was not required to determine anything so specific as
that in Overton, in which Secretary Volpe had to determine that no feasible, alternative high-
way route existed.
82. Home Box Office at 62 (MacKinnon, j., concurring). Judge MacKinnon felt that the
majority exceeded the authority offered by Overton for these reasons. Id. His view is bolstered
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). In Camp, the Supreme
Court ruled on a decision by the Comptroller of the Currency to deny a national bank charter
to parties interested in organizing a new bank in South Carolina. The Court held the Overton
rationale inapplicable because in Camp "there was a contemporaneous explanation of the agency
decision." Id. at 143. The Court held that the Comptroller's action should stand or fall based on
his findings. Similarly, in Home Box Office the FCC provided a statement of findings which
makes the case more analogous to Camp than to Overton.
Additionally, the Overton decision is inapplicable to Home Box Office because the proceeding
in Overton was not subject to § 553 of the APA. Overton constituted informal administrative
action instead of informal rulemaking. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, slip. op. No.
74-2006 at 36. Even if there was a need for the Court to impose procedural requirements
because no statute imposed them, there was no comparable need in Home Box Office because
Congress had clearly directed that they intended only the notice and comment provisions of §
553 to be applicable. See Auerbach, supra note 53, at 24-26.
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administrator take a lie detector test to ensure that the proferred
reasons for an action were truthful. 83 A more desirable approach
would require full disclosure of informational sources only where the
agency's action is under suspicion. 84
Finally, the court's requirement of a complete record for informal
rulemaking improperly identifies "the Court's role with that of the
agency both in the development of policy and the resolution of factual
issues." 85  If the purpose of informal rulemaking proceedings is edu-
cation of the administrative agency and effective public participation
in the proceedings, then engrafting a complete set of trial-type stric-
tures onto the notice and comment procedure is dysfunctional. Judi-
cial review has little to do with the purposes of the informal
rulemaking process. 86 The courts should intervene only when a
party's right to a fair hearing has been denied. 87 Generally, a party's
right to a hearing exists only as it is accorded by statute. 88 The stat-
ute defining the nature of the hearing in the Home Box Office case,
section 553, does not prohibit and may expressly permit ex parte con-
tacts.8 9 Furthermore, this statute facilitates the due process aims of
the court.90 Since the FCC complied with section 553, the manda-
tory prohibition on ex parte contacts imposed by the court seems
inappropriate. 91
One can also criticize the Home Box Office holding for its failure to
comprehend the possible effects of its blanket prohibition against ex
parte contacts. This ban would have a significant detrimental effect on
83. Action for Children's Television, slip. op. at 36. See Catterall, The State Corporation
Commission of Virginia, 48 VA. L. REv. 139, 145 (1962), for a similar argument.
84. The view of the Action for Children's Television court is that full disclosure of informa-
tion sources should occur when the proceeding involves conflicting claim to a valuable privilege.
Id. at 36-37. But see notes 103-17 and accompanying text infra.
85. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 19.
86. Id. at 32.
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id.
89. See note 27 supra.
90. Infon al Bargaining Process, supra note 42, at 832-39. In a well reasoned Note, the
author balances the value of ex parte contacts with the problems they engender and suggests
only notice and comment provisions (coupled with hearings on issues of major importance) and a
requirement for a written decision on any agreement made. These suggestions parallel § 553 of
the APA.
91. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 25, 26. A ban might be desirable where there are "recur-
ring divisions of interested parties," Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure (1941), Sen. Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 109, where the "pro-
ceedings may be discredited by other parties in the course of private conversations" or where
"the record evidence ... [is] so evenly balanced that the administrator could find either
way. ... Nathanson, supra note 27, at 25. However, these suggestions are directed to the
agencies who are in a better position than the courts to determine the appropriate procedures.
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administrative rulemaking, mandating cumbersome, stifling, and ex-
pensive procedures. 92 Additionally, although the ban reflects a valid
concern for the due process rights of the parties and the public, it
most likely will not accomplish its intended result. Private communi-
cations could still occur before the notice of proposed rulemaking is
issued. One commentator has suggested that the ban as proposed by
Home Box Office may merely force impatient administrators and reg-
ulated industry leaders to strike their secret bargain before the notice
is issued, making the subsequent notice and comment procedures
"even more of an empty shell than the Court itself seemed to feel
might have resulted from the presence of ex parte communica-
tions." 93  Thus, the court may have unwittingly reduced the public
participation that it was trying to foster.
ANALYSIS OF MACKINNON'S CONCURRENCE
Although the majority decision can be criticized as unwarranted in
light of prior case law and unworkable pragmatically, the due process
concerns raised by the court remain. In a concurring opinion, Judge
MacKinnon supported the ban of ex parte contacts on the much nar-
rower ground that the FCC had selectively disadvantaged competing
business interests in a manner having a large monetary impact. Such
treatment paralleled the FCC's choice between "conflicting claims to
a valuable privilege" in Sangamon. MacKinnon felt that when an
agency selectively treated such interests in an informal rulemaking,
the due process concerns began to outweigh the informational needs
of the agency.
Judge MacKinnon's approach, however significant, 94 has two flaws.
First, he attempted to place the facts of Home Box Office in the same
category as those in Sangamon. As discussed previously, the Sanga-
mon case involved a proceeding which closely resembled an adjudica-
tion. The number of parties was small and the interests were sharply
92. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text supra.
93. Nathanson, supra note 27, at 31. Impatience with adjudicatory procedures encouraged
the FCC and the FPC to turn to informal rulemaking procedures. A general ban on ex parte
contacts would encourage the disposition of a particular action before the initial notice triggers
the prohibition. Id.
It should be noted, though, that in Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court
was able to hold the Board's action invalid because secret meetings setting airline fare rates took
place between Commission and airline industry personnel before the required notice and hear-
ings required by the Federal Aviation Act took place.
94. MacKinnon's approach is especially significant because it was adopted by a different
panel of the same court that decided Hoose Box Office. Action for Children's Television v. FCC.
No. 74-2006, at 37-38 (July 1, 1977).
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delineated. The proceedings in Home Box Office, however, more
nearly resembled a legislative action. The proposed regulations were
susceptible to negotiation and compromise. 95 The different coali-
tional possibilities, suggesting a polycentric controversy, contrast
sharply with the bipolar controversy present in Sangamon.98  In ad-
dition, Home Box Office was a nationwide controversy involving the
allocation of many different privileges and penalties.
Judge MacKinnon's approach also fails for a number of reasons to
protect against the abuses sometimes resulting from ex parte contacts
without paralyzing the administrative agencies. 97 First, private
communications may be necessary or helpful in situations covered by
the MacKinnon approach. For example, if the number of parties were
small and their interests adverse, the best solution could be to reach
a compromise through negotiation. Such a course would be seriously
hampered by the MacKinnon rule, however. Similarly, if the number
of parties were large and their interests adverse, ex parte contacts
may be the most convenient investigative mode. Also, the rule pre-
cluding private communications with an interested party because the
nature of only one proceeding demands it may effect a "subjective
chill" on other communications that are not related to the particular
action mandating the ban. 98
Second, due process concerns are still present in non-Sangamon
proceedings. When an agency regulates only one major interest and
ex parte contacts occur during a rulemaking proceeding, public suspi-
cions as to the nature of the discussions and the merits of the result-
ing rule are still engendered. 99 In this type of situation, there is still
95. First Report & Order, 52 F.C.C. 2d, Dockets No. 19554 & 18893, adopted March 20,
1975, released April 4, 1975, at 23-143.
96. See Boyer, supra note 25, at 117, where the author states that, "the polycentric issue is
characterized by a large number of possible results and by the fact that many interests or groups
will be affected by any solution adopted .... [Additionally,] the number of relevant variables is
large ......
97. Judge MacKinnon made no claim that the Sangamon test alone always will protect
against administrative abuse. However, in light of Nathanson's statement that due regard for the
Sangamon principle may be sufficient to protect a party's right to a fair hearing, and in light of
the Action for Children's Television statement that the line requiring full disclosure should only
be drawn in Sangamon-type situations, it is worthwhile to consider whether the Sangamon test
offers a comprehensive strategy to deal with the problems ex parte contacts present in all infor-
mal rulemaking actions.
98. See, e.g., Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In
Van Curler, private communications between parties involved in a rulemaking action about
another related matter gave rise to the ex parte issue in that litigation. The possibility of litiga-
tion may make a party think twice before conferring with the Agency even if it concerns another
matter, restricting the flow of information.
99. The situation in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 74-2006 (July 1, 1977),
involved FCC regulation of only one major interest. Yet the public interest group was suspi-
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the possibility of undue influence being placed on an administrator.
Furthermore, ex parte contacts in every situation raise the doubt that
the administrative record before the reviewing court will not
adequately reflect the real findings. 100
Third, the MacKinnon test is triggered only when a substantial
interest is the subject of the rule. 10 1 The fact that there is a contest
in itself indicates that the parties feel the interest at stake is impor-
tant. Surely some degree of due process protection should attach
when a modest interest is at stake. Yet in that situation the MacKin-
non test offers no judicial protection whatsoever from the potentially
detrimental effects of ex parte contacts.
A final difficulty with the MacKinnon approach is that it creates the
possibility of diverting the reviewing court's focus from the value of
the promulgated rules. Because of the MacKinnon test, those oppos-
ing the regulations promulgated after ex parte contacts have occurred
will attempt to prove that the parties were diametrically opposed to
one another and were competing over a substantial interest. Their
efforts would lead to a delay in enacting the rule and much discussion
over collateral procedural issues. 10 2
Neither the majority nor the MacKinnon approach adequately rec-
ognize either the due process arguments against ex parte contacts or
the agency's need for information gleaned ex parte. What is needed is
an approach that will adequately recognize both considerations.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
In most cases, the balancing problem created by ex parte contacts
in informal rulemaking can be resolved by simply subjecting the ad-
cious of the secret meetings that took place between the FCC chairman and the television
industry. Allegations of impropriety were made in the 1950's when famous New Deal lawyer
Tommy Corcoran revealed that he had made ex parte approaches to several agency commission-
ers in a proceeding where the agency was regulating only one major interest. See Ablard, Ex
Parte Contacts with Federal Administrative Agencies, 47 A.B.A.J. 473 (1961).
100. However, the fact that the reasons given may not reflect the true motivations or that
they may be poorly articulated is a problem inherent in all decision making. Nathanson, supra
note 27, at 20.
101. Home Box Office at 62 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
102. See Peck, supra note 26, at 254-55. It could be noted that the Sangamon decision did
not open the floodgates to much litigation on the collateral procedural issues. But this is proba-
bly due to the fact that not even the author of the Sangamon test, amicus Henry Geller,
recognized the applicability of Sangamon to cases like Home Box Office and it was generally
thought that Sangamon was limited to its facts. Id. at 241. See also Petition for Certiorari at 38
n.45, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC. Now that Sangamon has been used as the appropriate test
in the Home Box Office concurrence and endorsed as the proper test in Action for Children's
Television, slip op. at 37, it is more likely that such litigation will be generated.
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ministrative record to a sufficiently rigorous standard of judicial re-
view.' 0 3 This approach would not completely ban ex parte contacts
from informal rulemaking and consequently would keep open a very
important source of information. 10 4 Rigorous review would minimize
any unfairness created by private consultations by providing a strong
incentive for the agency to reveal all facts and reasons which support
the promulgated rule.105  When the revealed evidence clearly sup-
103. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.00 (1976). The
arbitrary and capricious test, applicable to informal rulemaking, is often seen as less demanding
than the substantial evidence test applicable to agency adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(1970) (the substantial evidence test) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970) (arbitrary and capricious
test). See also Note, Judicial Reviewi of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard,
84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1975), which proposes varying the amount of factual support required by the
court to uphold a rule according to its availability and an analysis of the societal risks the
regulation alleviates. For example, the "impossibility of certainty in identifying the effect of a
pollutant on health would by itself rationalize reducing the level of proof required to the
EPA. ... Id. at 1768. Professor Davis believes that the courts should review the factual basis
of an agency record under the more rigorous substantial evidence test but when rules "consist
primarily of an exercise of a legislative judgment not dependent on a factual foundation, the
standard for review may be (the less rigorous) 'arbitrary and capricious test'." K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES at 663. The approach offered here is not primarily
designed for the agencies but rather for the courts. It is believed that the agencies should have
discretion to formulate their own procedures. Some, like the FCC, have taken into account the
Sanganwon decision and forbidden ex parte contacts in similar cases of informal rulemaking.
Others may forbid ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking actions. Still others may follow the
statutory requirements of § 553 and permit ex parte contacts.
104. The informal rulemaking record, according to Recommendation 74-4 of the Administra-
tive Conference, should include:
(1) the notice of the proposed rulemaking and any documents referred to therein;
(2) the comments and other documents submitted by interested persons;
(3) transcripts of oral presentations made during the course of the rulemaking;
(4) "factual information" not included elsewhere that was "considered by the au-
thority responsible for the promulgation of the rule or that is proffered by the
agency as pertinent to the rule";
(5) reports of advisory committees; and,
(6) the agency's concise general statement or final order and any documents
referred to therein.
See Model Review of Informal Rulemaking: Recommendation 74-4 of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, supra note 53, at 491-92. Number (4) above removes the power of
the agency to define its own record. Id. at 491 n.84. It is not clear whether this would mandate
that any ex parte communication considered by the agency would have to be included in the
record, because the administrator nearly always could contend that he or she did not consider
the communication, and because of the Action for Children's Television opinion. But see Home
Box Office at 57-58 n.130. Professor Davis contends that Recommendation 74-4 is fully sup-
ported by case law. K. DAVIS, supra note 103, at 669.
If the substance of the ex parte communication is disclosed in the agency findings, a party
could challenge that information by petitioning for reconsideration. 5 U.S.C.§ 553(3) (1970). The
Home Box Office requirement of disclosure before promulgation of the rule seems heavy-
handed in light of this fact.
105. An interesting contrast of approaches as to how to compile a record for judicial review is
offered by comparing Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
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ports the promulgated rule and when the aggrieved parties are un-
able to adduce facts and reasons which clearly controvert the agency's
decision, the rule could be upheld despite the possible influence of
ex parte communications. 10 6  When, however, the revealed evidence
does not clearly support the rule, the courts will be able to remand
the case for supplemental action or vacate the rule. 10 7
A supplemental approach would be necessary in a case such as
Home Box Office, in which the agency seemingly changed its initial
view on regulation immediately after private consultations with the
parties who ultimately benefited most from the regulations. 10 8 This
sort of situation creates a suspicion that the agency has abused its
power, and no standard of rigorous judicial review will eradicate that
suspicion.
The Home Box Office court decided that the occurrence of ex parte
contacts raised an irrebuttable presumption that the agency acted im-
properly.' 0 9 A preferred approach would have been for the court to
78-85 (1975) with Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between Adninis-
trative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15, 59-68 (1977).
Under Pedersen's proposal, the tentative rule and its explanation is placed in a central
rulemaking docket along with the major studies and other facts the agency has used to frame it.
When comments are received they are placed on that docket. In drafting the final rule the
agency is to answer the contentions raised in each comment in the process of explaining its
reasons for the final rule. Any fact or argument not originally publicized but used by the agency
must first be placed on the docket for public comment. Thus a chronological record is formed
logically illustrating the progress of the agency from tentative rule to the final rule.
Auerbach believes that the concept of on-the-record § 553 proceedings would "destroy the
simplicity, feasibility, and efficiency once associated (with § 553 proceedings)." Id. at 60.
Briefly, his proposal is to have a record formed from a formal on-the-record proceeding between
a rule protestant and the agency. This would limit the size of the record as the agency would
only have to respond to the issues raised by the protestant and would allow the agency to
otherwise use § 553 procedures to educate themselves and allow for public participation.
106. See Nathanson, supra note 27, at 22.
107. The ex parte communications in Home Box Office left the reviewable record incomplete
in Home Box Office, according to the court. Home Box Office at 57. Nevertheless, the court had
no trouble striking down the FCC's action on the basis that the rules were arbitrary and capri-
cious. See note 19 supra.
108. Home Box Office at 52-53, quoting from Brief of Amicus Curiae, Henry Geller, supra
note 14. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, No. 74-2006 (July 1, 1977), presented a
similar situation.
109. Home Box Office stated:
Moreover, where, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to infor-
mation in the public file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant
information that has been presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that
the agency has acted properly, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, at 415, 419-420; see K. Davis, supra note 103 at § 11.00 at 317
(1976), but must treat the agency's justifications as a fictional account of the actual
decision making process and must perforce find its actions arbitrary. ...
Home Box Office at 54-55.
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find a rebuttable presumption that an agency's action was improper if,
but only if, the aggrieved party could make a threshold showing that
ex parte contacts influenced the final form of the agency regula-
tion. 110  The presumption would shift the burden to the agency to
rebut it. Rebuttal could consist of proof that: (1) all the information
contrary to the privately submitted information was considered; 111 (2)
the information submitted privately did not concern or only remotely
concerned the subject matter of the particular rules; 112 (3) the infor-
mation submitted privately consisted completely of information al-
ready contained in the record; or (4) the aggrieved party had other
opportunities to contradict the information received ex parte. 113
The remedy imposed by prior courts usually has been to order dis-
closure and to allow comment on the substance of ex parte con-
tacts. 114  That approach closely parallels the one here outlined. It
allows for the disclosure of the substance of ex parte contacts when
the commission's action is under suspicion. It also covers all informal
rulemaking situations. Though it lacks the apparent simplicity of the
"conflicting claims to a valuable privilege" test, it provides protection
in instances left uncovered and more flexibility in situations covered
by that test, 115 since ex parte contacts are not prohibited per se. For
this reason, it is also more flexible than the Home Box Office majority
opinion, while it provides due process protection against an agency
action which subverts the prescribed informal rulemaking procedures.
110. Home Box Office at 52 n.107. Professor Davis points out that even in a proceeding on
the record, a party objecting to use of extra-record material cannot prevail without showing
prejudice. K. DAVIS, supra note 103, § 29.01-6 at 674.
111. The Action for Children's Television court emphasized that "the agency in good faith
examined all the relevant factors .... Action for Children's Television, slip op. at 38.
112. See, e.g., Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1956), where
a channel reassignment action was not vitiated by ex parte representations because they were in
regard to "a general nation-wide rule-making proceeding to deal with [another different but
related problem]." Id. at 730. See also Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.
1959), where ex parte information "was relevant to Board functions unconnected with the
[proceedings at issue]." Id. at 758.
113. This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
114. Often, too, a separate evidentiary hearing was held as to whether the agency member or
the party involved should be disqualified from further proceedings. This is what was done in
Home Box Office at 58-59. See also Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. FCC, 269 F.2d 221
(D.C. Cir. 1959); WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
115. This is especially true when the test is applied to cases like Home Box Office as per
MacKinnon's concurrence.
This approach also allows the court and the agency to dispatch the proceeding more effi-
ciently. The Sangamon remedy, as applied, delayed the FCC's action three years and finally
resulted in the disqualification of neither the Commissioners nor the offending party. As one
commentator noted, it seemed to be "a great and prolonged to-do about nothing." Peck, supra
note 26, at 274.
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Moreover, this solution encompasses and reconnects the prior case
law regarding ex parte influence. 1 6 Even a subsequent case, Action
for Children's Television v. FCC, which criticized the majority opin-
ion and endorsed the concurring opinion, can be interpreted as con-
sistent with this approach, for the ACT court emphasized "that the
agency in good faith examined all the relevant factors raised during
the comment stage, and comprehensively and rationally justified its
decision.""' In the ACT case the ex parte contacts consisted of a
negotiating session which did materially influence the action (in this
case the non-action) taken, but this statement can be interpreted as a
conclusion that the Commission demonstrated that it provided due
process to all affected, by considering all the relevant factors before
deciding.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that ex parte contacts have advantages as an inves-
tigative tool of administrative agencies. Private contacts are more
convenient than formal meetings and are often useful when negotiat-
ing with affected parties. These same contacts, however, sometimes
distort the informal rulemaking process, violating fundamental notions
of due process.
The Home Box Office court balanced the due process concerns with
the investigative advantages and imposed a blanket prohibition on ex
parte contacts. This prohibition was an unwarranted departure from
prior case law. It also will have severe detrimental effects on the
administrative agencies and may even be self-defeating. The more
limited approach taken in the concurring opinion is also inadequate.
116. See, e.g., Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1956), where
the presumption of impropriety was rebutted because the agency demonstrated that the ex
parte contacts only remotely concerned the subject of the rulemaking. In Courtaulds (Ala.) v.
Dixon, 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the court was faced with the allegation that ex parte
contacts had occurred in a rulemaking proceeding which eventually led to the promulgation of a
rule establishing generic names for manufactured textile fibers. In rejecting the claim that these
ex parte communications had violated due process, the court noted that there was "no evidence
that the Commission improperly did anything in secret or gave to any interested party advan-
tages not shared by all." Id. at 904-05. It would seem, therefore, that the aggrieved party could
not make the threshold showing necessary to establish the presumption, under the suggested
approach. In Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. FCC, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964), under the suggested approach, the party would have met the
threshold presumption of impropriety because the substance of the ex parte material was so
crucial to the FCC's disposition of the case. But under this approach the agency would have
been able, perhaps, to rebut it and then avoid the extensive delay which ultimately occurred.
117. See Action for Children's Television, slip op. at 38. Consequently, any presumption of
impropriety was rebutted.
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By banning ex parte contacts only when the proceeding is charac-
terized by conflicting claims to a valuable privilege or selective
agency treatment of interests of great monetary value, the approach
prohibits ex parte contacts in situations where they would be useful
and offers no procedural protection in other situations where it is
needed.
A more useful approach would apply a rigorous standard of review
toward agency action taken during informal rulemaking. This would
provide an incentive for the disclosure of relevant information re-
ceived privately. But for those instances where a party has been
selectively disadvantaged by an administrative agency after the oc-
currence of ex parte communications, it would be wise to presume
that the agency has acted unfairly. If the agency is then unable to
allay the suspicion of impropriety or prejudice, their action should be
remanded or stricken.
This approach is more flexible than either the majority or concur-
ring opinions of Home Box Office because it does not per se prohibit
ex parte contacts in every instance of informal rulemaking. However,
it is also comprehensive enough to cover all informal rulemaking ac-
tions and enables the courts to protect the public or an individual
from an abuse of administrative power. That protection is essential
not only to protect a particular party's right to due process of law, but
to maintain and safeguard the confidence of a democratic society in
the legitimacy of the administrative agencies.
Thomas Patterson
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